Louisiana Law Review
Volume 16 | Number 2
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1954-1955 Term
February 1956

Commercial Law: Corporations
Dale E. Bennett

Repository Citation
Dale E. Bennett, Commercial Law: Corporations, 16 La. L. Rev. (1956)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol16/iss2/20

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

19561

COMMERCIAL LAW

a relatively easy disposition of a case which would otherwise
have required consideration under Civil Code article 2529. The
plaintiff sued for rescission of an automobile sale, or in the
alternative a reduction in price, on the ground that it was held
out to him as new when in fact it was used. As another alternative he sued for treble the amount of the excess over a ceiling
price regulation as was his right under the price control provisions of the Defense Production Act of 1950.8 The trial court
gave judgment for twice, rather than treble, the amount of the
excess of the selling price over the federal ceiling price, which
under the act it had discretion to do.9 The Supreme Court affirmed, finding no error in the trial court's determination that
there had been a willful violation of the federal regulation. 10
Throughout the case, incidentally, it was assumed that the
federal cause of action stemmed from the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942,11 which was repealed effective June 30,
1947.12 Actually during 1952, when this sale took place, the
statutes in effect were the price and wage stabilization provisions of the Defense Production Act of 1950,1 which provided
the same cause of action for overcharges as contained in the
1942 legislation.
CORPORATIONS
Dale E. Bennett*
RELIEF FOR MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS

Darmana v. New Orleans Stock Yard' provides a valuable
guide to proper procedures for relief by minority shareholders
who are seeking to prevent the draining off of corporate assets
by way of unjustified executive salaries to the group in control.
The first issue in the case related to the nature of the remedy.
It was held that an injunction to prevent the further diversion
and misappropriation of corporate funds would be a more appropriate remedy than a receivership. The Supreme Court had
previously recognized the advantage of injunctive relief over the
8. Ibid.
9. 226 La. 881, 886, 77 So.2d 522, 523 (1955).
10. 64 STAT. 811 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §2109(c) (1952).
11. 56 STAT. 34 (1942), 50 U.S.C. § 925(e) (Supp. 1944).
12. 60 STAT. 664 (1947), 50 U.S.C. App. § 966 (Supp. 1951).
13. 64 STAT. 811 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 2109(c) (1952).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 226 La. 897, 77 So.2d 528 (1954).
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much more complex and expensive receivership device.

A second issue related to burden of proof. It was held that
where the directors vote themselves salaries as officers, the
burden of proof is upon them to show that such salaries are
reasonable. In the case at bar the director-officers, with the exception of the president, failed to sustain their burden of proof.
INSURANCE
J. Denson Smith*
An important and interesting problem was presented to the
court in McMahon v. Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Co.' An
insured automobile had been destroyed in a collision. The policy
contained a so-called "open" mortgage clause reading, "Loss or
damage, if any, under the policy shall be payable as interest may
appear to Assured and Rapides Bank & Trust Company. ' 2 The
value of the car at the time of the loss was $2,697.46. The interest of the mortgagee was in the sum of $1,751.00. The insured
alone sued to recover, claiming a total loss. The defendant insurer levelled an exception of no right or cause of action at the
failure to join the mortgagee as plaintiff. The Supreme Court
sustained the district court's action in overruling the exception.
Its position seemed to be that the open mortgage clause creates
no contractual relationship between the insurance company and
the mortgagee. It is the writer's opinion that this position does
not truly reflect the legal relations of the parties under such a
clause. The chief reliance of the court in the instant case seemed
to be on the earlier case of Officer v. American Eagle FireInsurance Co. 3 In that case the question was whether a mortgagee,
whose interest was protected by an open mortgage clause, was
bound by an adjustment of the loss between the insured and the
insurer in accordance with the terms of the policy. The court
held that he was and pointed out that this was the only question
before it, saying, "the case is now before us on the sole questions
[sic] whether Dr. Officer, mortgagee, and the succession representative of the assured are bound by the award made by the
appraisers."' 4 This holding no doubt reflected, and still reflects,
2. Cary v. Dalgarn Const. Co., 171 La. 246, 130 So. 344 (1930).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 227 La. 777, 80 So.2d 405 (1955).
2. Id. at 781, 80 So.2d at 406.
3. 175 La. 581, 143 So. 500 (1932).
4. Id. at 586, 143 So. at 501.

